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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900225 
v. : 
JAMES F. GARDNER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant James F. Gardner appeals his conviction for 
second degree murder, a first degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990), entered upon a guilty plea in the 
Eighth Judicial District Court, in and for Uintah County, Utah, 
the Honorable Richard C. Davidson, presiding, on April 2, 1985 
(R. 684). He also appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea, entered in the same court on April 2, 1990, the 
Honorable A. Lynn Payne, District Court Judge Pro Tern, presiding 
(R. 65, 282). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(i) (1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Has defendant alleged a question of "Indian 
jurisdiction" sufficient to require either a reversal of his 
conviction or a remand for jurisdictional fact findings? The 
Indian jurisdiction question is not mentioned in the trial court 
record. However, as will be set forth in this brief, the facts 
already developed in the record permit this Court to review the 
Indian jurisdiction question de novo and decide it as a matter of 
law, without further proceedings. 
2. Should defendant be allowed to withdraw his guilty 
plea to second degree murder, on the ground that it was not 
knowingly and voluntarily entered? The trial court denied 
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. Under the standards 
that apply to this case, the denial of a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea is reversed on appeal only if it plainly appears that 
the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Mildenhall, 747 
P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, addresses 
guilty pleas as follows: 
(5) The [trial] court may refuse to accept 
a plea of guilty or no contest, and may not 
accept the plea until the court has found: 
• • • 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a 
jury trial, and to confront and cross-examine 
in open court the witnesses against him, and 
that by entering the plea he waives all of 
those rights; 
(d) the defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the offense to which he is 
entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of these elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements; 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him 
for each offense to which a plea is entered, 
including the possibility of the imposition 
of consecutive sentences; 
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(f) if the tendered plea is a result of 
a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, 
and if so, what agreement has been reached . 
The text of any other constitutional provisibns, statutes, and 
rules pertinent to the resolution of this appeal is contained in 
the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in state court with second degree 
murder, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-203 (1990), in connection with a killing that occurred on or 
about March 6, 1985 (R. 1, 2).1 He pleaded guilty to the charge 
on April 2, 1985, and was sentenced to a term of five years to 
life at the Utah State Prison (see R. 103-116, 110, 115, 
reproduced at Addendum Exhibit 4 to Supplemental Br. of 
Appellant). 
Three years later, defendant, proceeding pro se, 
asserted that his guilty plea had been involuntarily entered (R. 
25-26). He then obtained counsel, who filed a motion to withdraw 
the plea (R. 61-62). That motion was heard in the same court, 
but by a different judge than the one who had originally accepted 
the plea (R. 65, 103). After an evidentiary hearing (R. 302-
*Record references are designated "R." The transcript of the 
hearing when defendant entered his guilty plea, the transcript of 
the hearing on his motion to withdraw that plea, and certain 
exhibits admitted in connection with that motion, have also been 
numbered into the record, and references to those items are also 
designated "Rj" some are also reproduced in the addenda to the pro 
se Brief of Appellant and/or the Supplemental Brief of Appellant 
filed by counsel. Some evidentiary exhibits were received but not 
nvunbered into the record; those exhibits will be referenced by 
their number or letter, e.g.. "State's exhibit X." 
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671), the trial court entered lengthy findings, and on April 2, 
1990, denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea (R. 271-82, 
reproduced at Addendum Exhibit 5 to Supp. Br. of Appellant). 
Defendant appealed, filing a pro se opening brief; new appellate 
counsel then filed a supplemental brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Crime 
The killing in question was committed in Vernal, Utah 
(R. 6; see also State's Exhibit E, received at R. 478-79; death 
certificate and autopsy report, reproduced at Addendum C to pro 
se Br. of Appellant). About two days after the killing, 
defendant spoke to Vernal police, and voluntarily stated that he 
had committed it (see R. 86-101, reproduced at Addendum B to pro 
se Br. of Appellant; State's Exh. H, received at R. 485). The 
killing was again described at the hearing when defendant entered 
his guilty plea (R. 109, 112-14). In denying the motion to 
withdraw his plea, the trial court relied on defendant's 
statement to the police and the plea hearing description for its 
findings, as follows: 
During apparently extended "partying," including the 
ingestion of alcohol and drugs, defendant went to a convenience 
store to replenish his beer supply (R. 88, 90, 271). There he 
met the male victim, Ricky Lane Abegglen, who invited defendant 
to his Vernal apartment (id.; State's Exh. E, received at R. 478-
79, at 1). Defendant stated that after listening to a couple 
albums of music, Abegglen kissed him on the mouth; enraged at 
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this homosexual act, defendant "pushed [Abegglen] back and I 
kicked him and just remember beating him and then I stopped" (R. 
88-89, 91-92, 271; State's Exh. H, at 2, 8). 
This assault immobilized Abegglen, but he did not 
immediately die. As Abegglen lay helpless, defendant put back on 
his shoes, which he had removed upon entering the apartment, and 
looked about the apartment for some food (R. 94, 113-14, 271; 
State's Exh. H, at 5). Abegglen then began struggling to get up, 
whereupon defendant attacked him again: 
"I know I quit or something, and he was 
laying there and he was breathing still, but 
his choke, it sounded like he was choking on 
his blood or something. And I remember I 
kicked him because he kept trying to get up 
once, and then he just didn't move man." 
(R. 92; see also R. 113-14, 271; State's Exh. H, at 5). 
Defendant stated that he unsuccessfully tried to resuscitate 
Abegglen after this second attack (R. 94-95), and then fled in 
Abegglen's car (R. 96, 272). He drove to various friends' and 
relatives' homes, recounting the killing and requesting 
assistance (R. 88-89, 93, 95, 272). He ultimately fled to a 
friend's home on a Colorado Indian reservation, where tribal 
police arrested him; defendant was subsequently turned over to 
Vernal police (R. 87, 95-96). 
The Guilty Plea 
In considering the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, 
the trial court examined the transcript of the plea hearing, 
along with testimony and exhibits received during the motion 
hearing. At the plea hearing, represented by trial counsel, 
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defendant pleaded guilty to the killing as second degree murder. 
In exchange for that plea, the State agreed to not prosecute the 
killing as first degree murder, to forego the possibility of 
automobile theft and habitual criminal charges, and to dismiss a 
pending three-count, third degree felony forgery charge (R. 107-
08, 273).2 
At the plea hearing, the trial court reviewed 
defendant's constitutional trial rights. The court did not 
specifically inform defendant of his right against self-
incrimination, but did inform him of the prosecution's burden of 
proof, adding that •• [y]our counsel and you don't have to do 
anything" for defendant to be found not guilty (R. 106, 278). In 
response to court inquiries, defendant denied that he was then 
under the influence of any intoxicants, and stated he had not 
been coerced or otherwise improperly induced to plead guilty (R. 
104, 107-09). 
Defendant told the trial court that he had beaten 
Abegglen (R. 109, 274). He denied intent to kill or to commit an 
act clearly dangerous to human life (.id.)- He admitted, however, 
that he had "engage[d] in conduct which created a grave risk of 
death to another, and that therefore caused death" (id..). He 
explained that Abegglen had "committed a homosexual act against 
2The dismissed forgeries were allegedly committed in Uintah 
County. A second degree felony forgery, committed in Duchesne 
County at about the same time, was prosecuted, and defendant was 
convicted (see R. 516-18, and defendant's exhibit D-l, at 2-3). 
That conviction was affirmed in State v. Gardner, 182 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 46 (Utah App. March 18, 1992), petition for cert, filed. No. 
920198 (Utah April 16, 1992). 
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me, and I don't care for homosexuals" (R. 113, 274). The 
prosecutor then described the killing, relating the first attack, 
followed by a "cool[ing] off," and then the second beating (R. 
113-14, 275). Defense counsel confirmed this version of the 
facts, differing only in that the second attack had been a single 
kick rather than repeated blows (jLd.). 
The trial court expressed specific concern that 
defendant's account of the killing, if heard by a jury, might not 
result in a guilty verdict for second degree murder. Defendant, 
however, reiterated his desire to plead guilty to that offense 
(R. 114, 275): 
THE COURT: You understand what you have 
described to me, Mr. Gardner, the county 
attorney will have a difficult time making 
out a case of second degree murder? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. I just don't want to take 
it through a trial. 
The trial court then reviewed the prosecutor's version of the 
killing with defendant (R. 115, 275): 
THE COURT: If you are not guilty of second 
degree murder this court won't accept a plea 
of second degree murder. Now, what the 
county attorney described to me the jury 
could very logically conclude that does meet 
the limits of a second degree murder, if 
those are the facts as they occured? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: It's still your desire to plead 
guilty to that charge? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Defendant's subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea turned in part upon an allegation that his defense counsel 
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had improperly advised him (R. 79-84). Accordingly, that counsel 
testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea (R. 
463-602). Counsel testified that defendant had steadfastly 
wished to plead guilty, and avoid trial (R. 276, 278, 465, 497, 
506, 509, 514). For his part, counsel had sought to protect 
defendant from a possible first degree murder prosecution, as 
well as from the forgery and habitual criminal charges; he had 
discussed these concerns with defendant (R. 466, 493, 495-97, 
513, 538). 
Defense counsel advised defendant of the several 
alternatives by which a jury might convict him of second degree 
murder, from intentional killing to "depraved indifference" (R. 
498-99, 510-11). Because defendant was able to clearly relate 
the killing, counsel believed that a diminished capacity defense, 
based on defendant's alcohol and drug consumption, could not 
succeed (R. 509-11). Counsel believed that the interval between 
the two beatings could be seen by a jury as a cooling off period 
that would weigh against a lesser, manslaughter verdict (R. 525-
26). He also believed that even if a manslaughter verdict were 
possible, concurrent guilty verdicts were likely for forgery and 
for theft of Abegglen's car, along with a possible habitual 
criminal finding (R. 527, 530). Accordingly, based on 
defendant's wishes, assessment of the risks, and upon 
consultation with defendant's family, defendant and counsel had 
decided that defendant would plead guilty to second degree murder 
(R. 513-14). 
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In denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the 
trial court also considered allegations that defendant's mental 
state at the time he decided to enter the plea made the plea 
involuntary. While in jail before entering his plea, defendant 
had been visited by a social worker who had observed defendant's 
varying degrees of anxiety and despair (State's Exh. F, received 
at R. 479). The social worker's notes reflect that medication 
was prescribed to help defendant sleep, but do not express 
concern that defendant's mental state made him unable to 
competently assess his situation (id..)* One such note, dated 
five days before defendant entered his plea, relates that 
defendant was then "beginning to realize the reality of going to 
prison on a life sentence" (id., note dated March 28, 1985). 
Defense counsel had also noted defendant's "depression" 
during jail visits, and found this to be normal under the 
circumstances. Counsel also stated that defendant had 
communicated clearly during consultations before entering his 
plea (R. 487-88). Accordingly, the trial court found that 
defendant had not been mentally incapacitated when he entered the 
plea (R. 277). 
In moving to withdraw the plea, defendant also alleged 
that his plea bargain was illusory (R. 68). The trial court 
rejected this argument, finding that the prosecution had not 
misrepresented the possibility of prosecuting defendant on other 
charges (R. 280). Noting that a jury could have disbelieved 
defendant's account of the killing, the court also ruled that a 
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first degree murder prosecution might have succeeded, such that 
the prosecution's agreement to not elevate the charge to first 
degree murder was also not illusory (R. 281)• 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court found that 
defendant's guilty plea had been knowingly and voluntarily made, 
affirming the finding made five years earlier when the plea was 
originally entered (R. 20). Accordingly, the motion to withdraw 
the plea was denied (R. 282). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's jurisdictional challenge is best dealt with 
summarily and on the merits. Even if the challenge has not been 
waived by failure to present it to the trial court, and even if 
defendant is an "Indian," this crime was committed in Vernal, 
Utah, which is outside "Indian country." Therefore, the state 
court had jurisdiction over this case. 
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was 
properly denied. His 1985 plea is subject to the requirement of 
"substantial compliance" with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Further, under the substantial compliance rule, a 
trial court's ruling on a plea withdrawal motion is reviewed on a 
deferential, abuse of discretion standard. The trial court 
substantially complied with Rule 11 when it accepted defendant's 
plea. Further, the trial court's exhaustive analysis of the 
motion to withdraw the plea confirms that the plea was knowingly 
and voluntarily entered, and not induced by illusory promises. 
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The trial court's denial of the plea withdrawal motion, and 
defendant's conviction, should therefore be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER 
THIS CASE. 
Defendant first argues that his conviction should be 
reversed because the State failed to establish jurisdiction 
(Supp. Br. of Appellant at 5). Alternatively, he argues that the 
case should be remanded to determine jurisdiction (.id. at 7). 
These arguments should be summarily rejected. 
Normally, offenses committed within Utah are subject to 
state court prosecution. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (1990). 
However, Utah courts do not have jurisdiction over offenses 
committed by "Indians" within "Indian country." See State v. 
Haaen, 802 P.2d 745, 746 (Utah App. 1990), cert, granted, No. 
910017 (Utah April 23, 1991). See generally Clinton, Criminal 
Jurisdiction Over Indian Landst A Journey Through a 
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503 (1976). 
Defendant's jurisdictional challenge is based upon his 
assertions that he is an Indian for jurisdictional purposes, and 
that he committed his crime in Indian country. The present rule 
in Utah is that when such an "Indian jurisdiction" challenge is 
raised, the prosecution must prove state court jurisdiction— 
i.e., that defendant is not an Indian, or the crime was not 
committed in Indian country—by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Hagen, 802 P.2d at 747. Contra State v. Klindt, 782 P.2d 401, 
11 
403-04 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (defendant raising Indian 
jurisdiction challenge must carry burden of proof). 
The record on appeal shows no sign that defendant ever 
raised an Indian jurisdiction challenge in the trial court. He 
argues, however, that "[t]he issue of jurisdiction may be raised 
at any time" (Supp. Br. of Appellant at 5). He also provides a 
personal affidavit purporting to show that he did raise the issue 
in the trial court (id. at Addendum Exhibit l).3 
Defendant also appealed a 1985 forgery conviction, in 
State v. Gardner, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah App. March 18, 
1992), petition for cert, filed. No. 920198 (Utah April 16, 
1992). In that appeal, he made similar jurisdictional arguments. 
Responding, the State argued that an Indian jurisdiction 
challenge is waivable, and that non-record materials could not 
show that the challenge had been raised. The pertinent portions 
of the State's brief in the forgery case are reproduced at 
Appendix I of this brief. Should this Court reject the State's 
primary argument in this case, the State's arguments in the 
forgery case should be considered as backup arguments. 
However, no backup arguments should be necessary. 
Instead, under the State's primary argument, this Court may 
assume, without deciding, that defendant's jurisdictional 
3There is no sign that a jurisdictional challenge was ever 
mentioned in any court, in either defendant's forgery case, State 
v. Gardner, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah App. March 18, 1992), or in 
this case, until after the court of appeals issued Hagen, on 
November 23, 1990. Defendant's pro se brief in this case, filed 
September 25, 1990, contains no Indian jurisdiction challenge. 
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challenge is properly before it, and not waived. The Court may 
also assume, without deciding, that defendant may be an Indian, 
and not a "terminated" one, for jurisdictional purposes. C£. 
Gardner, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47 (under alleged facts, defendant 
is a "terminated" mixed-blood Ute, expressly subject to state 
criminal jurisdiction). Even under these assumptions, defendant 
was clearly under state court jurisdiction, for he committed his 
crime outside of Indian country. 
As amply reflected in the record, defendant killed 
Ricky Abegglen in the latter's Vernal, Utah apartment (R. 6; see 
also State's Exhibit E, received at R. 478-79; death certificate 
and autopsy report, reproduced at Addendum C to pro se Br. of 
Appellant). Although the trial court never specifically ruled on 
this fact, defendant has never contested it. This Court can 
therefore confidently find, on the basis of the existing record, 
that defendant committed the crime in Vernal. 
Rather than contesting the situs of the crime, 
defendant's jurisdictional challenge rests upon his assertion 
that Vernal lies within Indian country. He bases this fantastic 
assertion on an imprecisely-drawn map, not part of the record but 
appearing at Addendum Exhibit 3 to his Supplemental Brief, 
purporting to identify "Ute Indian Territory ca. 1850."4 
4In Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072 (D. 
Utah 1981), the federal court criticized the parties' submission of 
"a local cafe's dinner table placemat" as evidence in a reservation 
boundary question, jLd. at 1150 n.202B. Defendant's map here seems 
to offer little more in the way of authenticity or accuracy. 
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Defendant committed his crime 135 years too late to avail himself 
of this definition of "Indian country." 
Further, federal law expressly defines Indian country, 
for criminal jurisdiction purposes, as all lands within Indian 
reservations, plus certain "dependent Indian communities" and 
"Indian allotments." 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982). The reservation 
nearest to Vernal is the Uintah and Ouray Reservation; its 
boundaries were exhaustively litigated in the 1980s. See Ute 
Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Utah 1981), 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en 
banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986). At no time in the 
reservation's existence has Vernal been within its boundaries. 
See map in Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F. Supp. at 1188, reproduced at 
Appendix II of this brief (detailing original and current 
reservation boundaries). Nor does it appear that by any stretch 
of imagination, Vernal can be considered a "dependent Indian 
community" or "Indian allotment." See United States v. Mound, 
477 F. Supp. 156, 157-58 (C.D.S.D. 1979). 
Defendant's jurisdictional challenge is therefore 
meritless. This Court may choose to give it minimal attention. 
See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY PLEADED 
GUILTY TO SECOND DEGREE MURDER. 
Defendant's next claim merits closer attention. He 
argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea 
because it was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The State 
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agrees that an accused's punishment should not depend upon a plea 
of guilty that is unknowingly or involuntarily given. See State 
v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-13 (Utah 1987) (discussing United 
States Supreme Court cases). Here, however, the trial court 
correctly ruled that defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered 
his guilty plea. 
A. The Trial Court's Denial of the Motion to Withdraw 
Defendant's 1985 Guilty Plea is Entitled to 
Deference on Appeal. 
At the outset, the proper standard of appellate review 
must be identified. For two reasons, the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea should be given 
deference on appeal. 
First, defendant entered his guilty plea two years 
before this Court decided Gibbons. Gibbons requires a trial 
court to establish, on the record, strict compliance with Rule 
11(5), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, before a guilty plea may 
be accepted. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-14; explained in State v. 
Maauire, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah April 10, 1992), and State 
v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1122-23 (Utah 1991). The purpose of this 
rule is to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. 
Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1122. 
However, in Hoff, this Court specifically held that the 
"strict compliance" rule does not apply retroactively to pre-
Gibbons pleas. Instead, such pleas are governed by the 
requirement of "substantial compliance" with Rule 11(5). 814 
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P.2d at 1123-24. Therefore, this 1985 plea should be examined 
for substantial, not strict, compliance with Rule 11(5). 
Second, under the "substantial compliance" test, the 
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reversed on 
appeal only if it plainly appears that the trial court abused its 
discretion. State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987) 
(construing Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1990) (guilty plea may only 
be withdrawn upon showing of good cause)). Put differently, a 
trial court's finding that a pre-Gibbons plea was knowing and 
voluntary is reversed on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous. 
Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989). 
Such deferential appellate review is particularly 
appropriate here, because defendant's motion to withdraw his plea 
was thoroughly litigated in the trial court. The judge who heard 
the motion was different from the one who accepted the plea, 
reducing any concern that the judge might have been invested in 
preserving "his" plea. Defendant was assisted by professional 
counsel in his motion (R. 302). Numerous exhibits were admitted, 
and testimony was heard, during an eight-hour hearing, generating 
357 pages of transcript (R. 305, 666). Finally, the trial court 
reviewed the evidence in detail, generating a twelve-page, 
single-spaced decision (R. 271-82). Deferential review of a task 
carefully done is proper. 
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B. All Evidence Received Bv the Trial Court in 
Considering the Motion to Withdraw the Plea Should 
be Considered bv this Court on Appeal. 
Defendant has overlooked Hoff, and its clear holding 
that pre-Gibbons guilty pleas are examined only for substantial 
compliance with Rule 11(5). He also asks this Court to disregard 
"other information outside of the plea hearing transcript" in 
reviewing the trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw his 
plea (Supp. Br. of Appellant at 14). This "other information" 
consists of the documentary and testimonial evidence received by 
the trial court in considering the plea withdrawal motion. 
The State agrees that substantial compliance with Rule 
11(5) is best addressed by examination of the plea hearing 
transcript, as defendant requests. However, with respect to the 
ultimate question of whether the plea was knowingly and 
voluntarily entered, appellate reference to the evidence received 
by the trial court in considering the motion to withdraw the plea 
is both proper and necessary. Review of that evidence is proper 
because defendant's present request to disregard it amounts to an 
objection that was not made in the trial court, which should be 
rejected under Rule 103(1), Utah Rules of Evidence.5 
Next, consideration of the evidence received during the 
motion to withdraw the plea is necessary for reviewing 
defendant's claim that his plea was involuntarily and unknowingly 
defendant's request to disregard on-record evidence bearing 
on his motion to withdraw his plea is astonishing in light of the 
fact that he relies entirely on non-record materials in pursuing 
his Indian jurisdiction claim. 
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entered. This, after all, is the core constitutional issue 
decided by the trial court, and now on review here. As the trial 
court observed, all evidence bearing on the issue of whether the 
plea was a product of defendant's informed, free choice is 
relevant (R. 484). Accord Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 
1989) (reviewing record as a whole in deciding whether plea was 
knowing and voluntary); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1273-76 
(Utah 1988) (same). 
Defendant's request to ignore evidence received during 
the motion to withdraw his plea is also an outright slap at the 
trial court. According to defendant, the trial court's effort to 
resolve the motion fairly and accurately, by receiving all 
evidence bearing on whether the guilty plea was knowingly and 
voluntarily made, is to be disregarded. This is nonsense. 
Therefore, the State will address the question of 
whether the trial court substantially complied with Rule 11(5) 
primarily through reference to the transcript of the plea 
hearing. However, the question of whether defendant's plea was 
knowingly and voluntarily made—or, more accurately, the question 
of whether the trial court correctly determined that it was so 
made—will also be addressed with reference to all the evidence. 
C. Defendant's Guilty Plea Was Taken in Substantial 
Compliance with Rule 11(5). Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
Defendant alleges ten instances of non-compliance with 
Rule 11(5) and other Rule 11 provisions by the trial court in 
accepting his guilty plea (Supp. Br. of Appellant at 11-13). 
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However, the plea hearing transcript demonstrates that the court 
substantially complied with Rule 11. 
First, defendant claims that the trial court failed to 
advise him of the entire statutory charge. To the contrary, 
defendant was informed that he was charged with murder in the 
second degree; the court then recited three ways in which 
defendant might be guilty of that crime under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-203(1) (a), (b), and (c) (1990) (R. 105). The gist of the 
court's recitation is correct, and two initially-omitted 
statutory phrases can be viewed as surplusage.6 Further, in his 
colloquy with the court, defendant specified that he was pleading 
guilty only under subsection 76-5-203(1)(c), admitting that he 
"engage[d] in conduct which created a grave risk of death to 
another, and that therefore caused death" (R. 109). 
Defendant also described the offense in his own words 
(R. 109, 113), as approved by this Court in State v. Copeland, 
765 P.2d 1266f 1273 (Utah 1988). Under these circumstances, the 
court substantially complied with the requirement that defendant 
"understandf] the nature and elements of the offense to which he 
is entering the plea . . .." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5)(d). 
Defendant next argues that the trial court did not 
inform him that his guilty plea was an admission of the elements 
of his crime, as required under Rule 11(5)(d). This is 
6The court omitted "intending to cause serious bodily injury 
to another" in reciting subsection (l)(b); it omitted "engages in 
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another" in reciting 
the "depraved indifference" subsection, (l)(c). 
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technically true; however, the court did tell defendant that at 
trial, the prosecution would "have to go forward and prove each 
and every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt," as 
required (R. 106). He was further told that he could only be 
convicted upon a unanimous jury verdict (id.)- And, as already 
noted, defendant himself identified the particular statutory 
elements that supported his guilt, denying those that he did not 
believe applied to his crime (R. 109). Again, Rule 11(5)(d) was 
substantially obeyed. 
Defendant's distinction of the several ways in which he 
could be guilty of second degree murder, and identification of 
the specific way in which he believed himself to be guilty, also 
clearly reflect his ability to understand the English language. 
Defendant expressly denied that he was under the influence of 
intoxicants when he entered the plea (R. 104). Nor does he argue 
that he was too young, or mentally incompetent to understand the 
proceeding. Such detailed inquiries are not required under Rule 
11. However, the inquiries that were made, and defendant's 
statements at the plea hearing, satisfied the trial court's core 
obligation to assure that defendant understood the proceeding and 
its consequences• 
Defendant also complains that the court did not ask him 
whether he had been provided a sufficient opportunity to fully 
discuss his rights and his plea with his attorney. This claim of 
non-compliance with Rule 11(1) is not borne out. Defendant 
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agreed that defense counsel had discussed his rights with him, 
and said he was satisfied with counsel's services (R. 105, 107). 
Next, defendant asserts that he was not advised of his 
right to subpoena witnesses on his behalf. He is apparently-
referring to his sixth amendment right to "obtain[] witnesses in 
his favor." Rule 11 does not require recitation of this 
information; defendant cannot amend the rule to include such 
recitation, and then make that amendment retroactively 
applicable. As earlier noted, even "strict compliance" with the 
rule as now written is not retroactively required. 
Defendant was not expressly told of his right against 
self-incrimination. This is not error under the Rule 11 
substantial compliance test, where the record otherwise shows 
that defendant knowingly waived his rights. Warner v. Morris, 
709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985). Here, defendant was told, "Your 
counsel and you don't have to do anything [in defense]. They 
[the prosecution] have the burden of going forward, and if they 
fail in their burden in any way then you are not going to be 
found guilty" (R. 106-07). This effectively informed him of his 
right against self-incrimination.7 Defendant was also informed 
of his cross-examination right (R. 106). The straightforward 
explanation of his core fifth and sixth amendment rights 
represents substantial compliance with Rule 11(5)(c) and (d). 
7Further, as noted by the trial court in denying the plea 
withdrawal motion, at the time of his plea, defendant had been 
twice given "Miranda" warnings by police, including the self-
incrimination provision (R. 278; R. 87, reproduced at Addendum B to 
pro se Br. of Appellant; State's Exh. H, received at R. 485). 
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Defendant also complains that he was not told of his 
right to State-paid counsel on possible appeal. Rule 11 contains 
no such requirement. Indeed, the trial court went beyond Rule 11 
in informing defendant of a counsel-assisted appeal right from 
any jury verdict of guilty, and warning him that his guilty plea 
amounted to a relinquishment of that right (R. 106, 107). 
Defendant argues that the trial court failed to inform 
him of the possible sentences for second degree murder, as 
required by Rule 11(5)(e). Not true. The trial court initially 
omitted this information, but then specifically corrected itself, 
warning defendant of a possible five-to-life sentence plus a 
fine. The court then asked, "Does that make any difference to 
your plea previously entered?" Defendant responded, "No, sir" 
(R. 111-12). Defendant's suggestion that this exchange did not 
correct the initial oversight violates common sense. 
Defendant also points out that the possibility of 
consecutive sentences was not explained to him, referring to the 
fact that he was on parole from an Oregon prison when he 
committed the Utah killing (R. 110). By its terms, however, the 
applicable Rule 11(5)(e) requirement appears directed to 
situations where a defendant pleads guilty to several offenses; 
defendant cites no authority to the contrary. Because this plea 
was to a single offense, the question of consecutive versus 
concurrent sentencing was not an issue in taking the plea. 
Additionally, any impact that defendant's murder plea 
might have upon his parole in another state should be regarded as 
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a "collateral consequence," rather than a sentencing possibility. 
It is widely held that full knowledge of every possible 
collateral consequence of a guilty plea is not necessary for the 
plea to be valid. See United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 
922 (2nd Cir. 1954); Semon v. Turner, 289 F. Supp. 803, 807 (D. 
Utah 1968); Carson v. State, 755 P.2d 242, 244 (Wyo. 1988). 
Further, defendant was presumably aware, better than anyone else 
involved, of the terms of his Oregon parole, and the likely 
consequence of his Utah plea upon it.8 In not advising 
defendant of possible "consecutive sentences," then, the trial 
court did not fail to substantially comply with Rule 11. 
Defendant also complains that the plea colloquy was 
generally inadequate, apparently asserting that the trial court 
did not adequately examine the factual basis for the guilty plea 
(Supp. Br. of Appellant at 12). In this regard, the Utah Court 
of Appeals has pointed out that Utah's Rule 11, unlike its 
federal counterpart, does not require a review of the evidence 
before accepting a guilty plea. State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 
478 & n.3 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. No. 910347 (Utah Feb. 
28, 1992). The proper inquiry, then, is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in not conducting a more searching fact 
8See Carson, 755 P.2d at 244-45: MWe will not require our 
trial courts to consult astrologers or invoke psychic powers to 
comply with [Rule 11 analogue] Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P." 
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, it was 
learned Oregon authorities agreed to terminate any hold they might 
have on defendant if he was committed in Utah (R. 495). This was 
a benefit received for his plea, and also indicates that any 
failure to probe his parole status was ultimately harmless. 
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inquiry. Smith, 812 P.2d at 478. No such abuse of discretion 
occurred here. 
Indeed, the trial court was particularly concerned that 
the prosecution might not be able to convict defendant of second 
degree murder (R. 114). In response to this expressed concern, 
defendant stated that he did not wish to proceed to trial (id.). 
The court then warned defendant that it would not accept a plea 
to second degree murder if he was not guilty of that offense; it 
noted, however, that a jury could find him guilty if it agreed 
with the facts as recited by the prosecutor. Defendant then 
reiterated his desire to plead guilty (R. 115). This colloquy 
amply established that defendant was knowingly and voluntarily 
entering his plea; indeed, he was determined to do so. 
Thus the trial court did everything but advise 
defendant against making the plea. Had it so advised defendant, 
the court would have arguably violated Rule 11(8)(a), which 
prohibits the court from participating in "plea discussions." 
See State v. Kav, 717 P.2d 1294, 1301 (Utah 1986). Defendant's 
vague complaint that the colloquy should have been "much more 
thorough" (Supp. Br. of Appellant at 12) should therefore be 
rejected: the trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
examining the factual bases for the plea. 
It should also be noted that the trial court 
specifically asked defendant whether he had been induced to enter 
his guilty plea by improper promises or threats (R. 107-08). 
This inquiry disclosed the State's agreement to forego possible 
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first degree murder, auto theft, and habitual criminal charges; 
the State also expressly stated that it would not recommend 
lenient sentencing (R. 108). That done, defendant affirmed that 
he freely chose to enter the plea, and that he was guilty of 
second degree murder (R. 109). The trial court thus gave special 
attention to the Rule 11(5)(b) requirement that a guilty plea be 
voluntarily made. 
In sum, defendant's Rule 11-based complaints cannot 
prevail. The trial court substantially complied with the rule, 
and in some respects exceeded its requirements, when it accepted 
defendant's guilty plea. 
D. Defendant's Guilty Plea Was Otherwise Knowingly 
and Voluntarily Entered. 
The trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw 
defendant's guilty plea may be subject to affirmance solely on 
the basis of substantial compliance with Rule 11 when the plea 
was entered. However, in denying the plea withdrawal motion, the 
court did not restrict itself to the letter of Rule 11. Instead, 
it carefully examined whether the plea had been knowingly and 
voluntarily entered. As follows, the trial court correctly ruled 
that it was so entered. 
At the outset, a distinctive feature should be noted. 
In denying the motion to withdraw the plea, the trial court found 
that M[a] review of the record indicates that Defendant was 
determined to conclude this matter by entering a plea. He 
expressed his desire to end this matter quickly to the police, 
his family, his attorney, and the Court" (R. 278). On appeal, 
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defendant does not contest this finding, which is amply supported 
by the evidence. See R. 100-01 (police statement), R. 436-37, 
445 (testimony of defendant's mother and sister), R. 465, 501, 
509 (testimony of defense counsel), R. 114, 115 (plea hearing). 
Under such circumstances, this Court has upheld a 
guilty plea against a claim that it was improperly received. 
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968, 970 (1968) 
(defendant had "indicated his desire to waive trial and enter a 
plea of guilty"). And even if defendant's desire to plead guilty 
was driven by the emotional distress observed by counsel and by 
the social worker who visited him in jail (R. 487-88; State's 
Exh. F, received at R. 479), this does not render his plea 
involuntary. See State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1237 (Utah 1989) 
("mere distress, nervousness, or emotional upset at the time of 
pleading does not establish mental incompetence to plead"). 
Further, before entering his plea on April 2, 1985, 
defendant was aware that the likely consequence would be five 
years to life imprisonment (R. 502; State's Exh. F, note dated 
March 28, 1985). Defendant's consistent desire to enter the 
plea, and his awareness of its likely consequence at the time it 
was entered, should be borne in mind now, seven years later, in 
considering arguments aimed toward escaping that consequence. 
1. Claim of "Illusory Plea Bargain." 
Defendant argues that his plea bargain was illusory, in 
that the charges foregone in exchange for the plea could not have 
succeeded (pro se Br. of Appellant at 4-7). This argument, first 
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of all, can be rejected as an effort to try those charges at the 
appellate level: his plea was a waiver of trial. As to those 
charges, defendant makes no claim that the concurrently pending 
forgery charges could not have succeeded; therefore, he did 
benefit from the dismissal of those charges (R. 107-08). 
Defendant does claim that he could not have been 
convicted of first degree murder, such that the prosecution's 
agreement to forego that charge was illusory. However, the trial 
court determined that there was a basis for the prosecution to 
believe, in good faith, that a first degree murder prosecution 
might succeed (R. 281). Relying on State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 
546, 571 (Utah 1987) (construing Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 
(1990)), the court noted that first degree murder occurs when a 
killing is committed during commission of a number of enumerated 
crimes. The court further noted that burglary or aggravated 
burglary, among those enumerated crimes, might be shown, based 
upon defendant's two attacks on the victim, separated by time he 
spent looking through the victim's home. This analysis is 
consistent with defense counsel's explanation to defendant of a 
possible first degree murder conviction (R. 496). Finally, even 
if the risk of such a conviction was low, it was not wholly 
absent, and avoidance of that risk was a benefit received for the 
plea. Thus the agreement to forego the first degree murder 
charge was not illusory. 
Defendant also complains that the habitual criminal 
charge could not have succeeded, such that foregoing this charge 
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was also illusory. However, at the plea hearing, the prosecutor 
pointed out that a possible auto theft charge "may allow or may 
have allowed" a habitual criminal determination (R. 108); the 
possibility was not presented as a certainty. The possibility 
had been discussed by defendant and counsel in reaching the 
decision to enter the second degree murder plea (R. 493). That 
decision—to avoid a "possibility"—might be second-guessed, but 
such second-guessing cannot establish that the plea was 
involuntary or unknowing. 
2. Claim of "Confusion- About Offense. 
Defendant also claims that he was confused about the 
murder charge during the plea hearing (pro se Br. of Appellant at 
13-15). He says he became confused because of the trial court's 
reference to the possibility that defendant might have killed the 
victim in the "heat of passion" (R. 113), apparently referring to 
a possible manslaughter verdict under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
205(1)(b) (1990) (causing death while under "extreme emotional 
disturbance"). At the hearing of the plea withdrawal motion, 
defendant claimed that he thought the trial court was thus 
"derogatorily calling [him] a homosexual" (R. 411). 
This claim is met by two responses. First, the trial 
court was not obliged to believe defendant's testimony, nearly 
five years after the fact, as to his "confusion" during the plea 
hearing. State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977). 
Second, any "confusion" or homophobic upset possibly 
caused by the "heat of passion" reference was obviated by 
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defendant's explicit admission to second degree murder under the 
"depraved indifference" provision, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(c) 
(1990), while denying the alternative intentional killing 
elements of the crime. That admission was planned after detailed 
consultation with counsel about the possible second degree murder 
elements (R. 498-99). His "confusion" did not cause him to plead 
other than planned; instead, he stuck to his plan. 
3. Claim of "Unknowing" Mental State. 
Defendant also emphasizes his statement, at one point 
in the plea hearing, that he did not "know what he was doing" 
when he killed the victim (pro se Br. of Appellant at 13-14; R. 
113). He argues that this statement shows that he did not 
"consciously engage" in conduct that caused death, and therefore 
was not guilty of "depraved indifference" murder. This isolated 
statement contradicts his own version of the killing at the plea 
hearing: "He [the victim] committed a homosexual act against me, 
and I don't care for homosexuals" (R. 113). 
Further, defendant never denied that the beating 
consisted of two episodes (R. 113-14); his detailed recitation of 
the killing shows an ability to recall the event that belies any 
suggestion that nc did not know what he was doing (see R. 92; R. 
276-77). Defendant's own recollection of the circumstances of 
the killing therefore shows that he had sufficient knowledge of 
his action to establish the form of second degree murder to which 
he pleaded guilty. See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1045-47 
(Utah 1984) (requisite "knowing" mental state for depraved 
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indifference murder can be inferred from circumstances) (R. 280). 
Andf once again, this assessment had been made by defense 
counsel, and discussed with defendant, in deciding to enter the 
guilty plea (R. 509-11, 525-26). 
4. Effectiveness of Defense Counsel. 
Defendant also argues that his plea was unknowingly 
entered because his counsel failed to adequately advise him of 
all possible defenses to second degree murder (pro se Br. of 
Appellant at 27-34). In denying the plea withdrawal motion, the 
trial court found that defense counsel had functioned "within the 
broad range of choices that competent counsel may have made in 
undertaking the defense" (R. 278; R. 275, 276). In so ruling, 
the trial court correctly applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984), followed by this Court in State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182 (Utah 1990). Those cases hold that "[jJudicial scrutiny 
of counsel's performance must be highly deferential," accounting 
for "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Templin, 805 P.2d at 188. 
Defense counsel acknowledged that in consulting with 
defendant, he discussed the possibility of manslaughter "a little 
bit;" the emphasis was apparently on second degree murder (R. 
498). Defendant now argues that counsel should have aggressively 
advised him to go to trial, in hopes that a manslaughter 
conviction—and attendant lesser punishment—might have resulted. 
This is tantamount to a suggestion that counsel should have 
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performed unreasonably, contrary to his client's consistent wish 
to resolve the matter through a guilty plea (R. 278, 596). 
Further, even if defendant misunderstood the "heat of 
passion" manslaughter possibility, the evidence is that counsel 
had thought this approach through, and concluded that it could 
very well fail. This, again, was based upon his assessment that 
a "cooling-down" period between defendant's two attacks on the 
victim could have been found by a trial jury (R. 496, 582, 598-
99). Counsel further believed that a jury might disbelieve 
defendant's description of the killing, and find that he had 
committed it in the course of a deliberate robbery (R. 576).9 
Either eventuality could have led to a second degree murder 
conviction, or worse. Counsel's decision to not pursue the 
manslaughter possibility more aggressively, then, arose both from 
his client's desire and considered professional judgment. 
The trial court thus correctly found that defendant had 
been competently represented by counsel in entering his guilty 
plea. Accordingly, it is not necessary to ask whether, had 
counsel performed differently, there was a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable result, as needed to complete a Strickland 
ineffective counsel claim. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
118-19 n.2 (Utah 1989). It is observed, however, that defendant 
can merely speculate that he would have been found guilty only of 
manslaughter had this matter proceeded to trial. 
9This possibility was noted by a police officer who 
investigated the case. See State's Exh. E, admitted at R. 171-72, 
at pp. 2-3. 
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Speculating to the contrary, defendant might have been 
found guilty of first degree murder, forgery, burglary, or theft, 
and received a habitual criminal judgment. These possibilities 
could have led to the same or worse punishment than he received 
through his plea. See Utah Code Ann. S§ 76-3-206(1), 76-5-202(2) 
(first degree murder: life sentence or death); 76-8-1001 
(habitual offender may be sentenced to life imprisonment) (1990). 
Any "more favorable result" speculation therefore fails. 
Summary 
The trial court took care to review all evidence 
pertinent to the offer and acceptance of defendant's guilty plea 
at the time it was entered (see R. 484). As a result, it 
developed a comprehensive record of the circumstances surrounding 
that plea. Compare Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 239-40 
(1969) (trial court record was "wholly silent" on voluntariness 
question). Defendant's decision to plead guilty might, in 
hindsight, be deemed unwise; defendant may now fervently regret 
it. However, the trial court, based on all the evidence, found 
that defendant's decision was knowing and voluntary. That 
finding should be honored by this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction of 
second degree murder, and the denial of his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea to that offense, should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ' day of June, 1992. 
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Attorney General 
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APPENDIX I 
(State's Brief in Forgery Case) 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
JAMES F. GARDNER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 900379-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION FOR 
FORGERY, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501(3)(b) 
(1990), A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN THE EIGHTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DUCHESNE COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE A. LYNN PAYNE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
PRO TEM, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
Attorneys for Appellee 
JAMES F. GARDNER, Pro Se 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The forgery for which defendant was convicted occurred 
in the city of Roosevelt (T. 8/14/85 at 18), which lies within 
the boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation. See 
map appended to Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 
1072, 1188 (D. Utah 1981). Trial testimony showed that defendant 
had, without authorization, obtained check blanks belonging to 
his brother-in-law and negotiated one of these for 150 dollars 
(T. 8/14/85 at 10-12, 15-16).l 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant never raised his jurisdictional challenge in 
the trial court. Nor was the the prosecution or the trial court 
otherwise informed of the need to prove jurisdiction by showing 
that defendant is not an Indian. 
Indian jurisdiction is usually treated as a question of 
subject matter jurisdiction, which is not waived by the absence 
of a timely trial court objection. However, based on policy 
considerations and sound precedent, this jurisdictional challenge 
should be considered waived by defendant's failure to raise it in 
the trial court, and the conviction should be affirmed. 
If defendant's belated factual assertions about Indian 
status are assumed to be true, his conviction should be affirmed 
under the Ute Partition Act of 1954. Under that Act, defendant, 
*Record citations: "R.,f refers to the trial court record in 
this case only, defendant's forgery conviction. "T.M refers to 
hearing transcripts on the date indicated in this case, including 
defendant's petition for postconviction relief. 
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as a "mixed-blood" Ute Indian, is subject to state court criminal 
jurisdiction. 
If this court will not affirm the conviction on either 
of the foregoing bases, the resolution of this jurisdictional 
challenge still turns on the fact-sensitive issue of whether 
defendant is an Indian. In this event, because no evidence on 
this issue exists in the present trial court record, defendant's 
challenge should be remanded to the trial court. On remand, 
defendant should bear the burden of proving that jurisdiction was 
lacking. 
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT 
Some background on the law of Indian criminal 
jurisdiction as it applies to this case is helpful to place the 
arguments in perspective. A thorough overview is found in 
Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey 
Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503 (1976) 
("Clinton") (copied at Appendix 1 of this brief). As a general 
rule, criminal jurisdiction over Indian country rests exclusively 
with the federal courts. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8; Utah Const. 
Art. Ill; 18 U.S.C. SS 1152, 1153 (1988); Ex Parte Pero, 99 F.2d 
28, 29 (7th Cir. 1938), cert, denied, 306 U.S. 643, 59 S. Ct. 581 
(1939); Clinton at 523 & n. 94. 
Congress, however, has authorized certain exceptions to 
the general rule. Title 18 U.S.C, sections 1152 and 1153, read 
together, specifically except "minor" Indian against Indian 
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crimes within Indian country from exclusive federal 
jurisdiction.2 Jurisdiction over such crimes is in the tribal 
courts. United States v. Antelope. 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2, 97 S. 
Ct. 1395, 1397 n. 2 (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 61, 102nd Cong., 1st 
Sess., at 3-4, (1991) (attached as exhibit D to Br. of 
Appellant).3 
Congress has also granted some states criminal 
jurisdiction over at least portions of Indian country, under 18 
U.S.C. S 1162 (1988). Utah is not included under this particular 
grant of jurisdiction. Congress now also allows state 
jurisdiction over Indian offenses in Indian country upon the 
express consent of Indian tribes, and Utah has expressed its 
willingness to accept such jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. S 1321 
(1988); Utah Code Ann. S 63-36-201 (Supp. 1991). To date, 
however, Utah has received no tribal consent to state 
jurisdiction under these provisions. 
However, another important source of congressionally-
authorized state jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country 
2Section 1152 states that federal jurisdiction "shall not 
extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or 
property of another Indian . . . ." However, section 1153, the 
Major Crimes Act, takes back much of this section 1152 exception, 
bringing certain major crimes by Indians in Indian country, whether 
or not against other Indians, within federal jurisdiction. 
Clinton questions whether tribal jurisdiction over Indian 
against Indian crimes is indeed limited to minor crimes. 18 Ariz. 
L. Rev. at 559-60. However, tribal courts are limited in the 
punishment they may mete out, to one year imprisonment or a 
$5000.00 fine, or both, per offense. 25 U.S.C. S 1302(7) (1988). 
3Section 1152 also exempts crimes punished by tribal law, and 
crimes where jurisdiction rests in the tribe by treaty, from 
federal jurisdiction. Clinton reports that the only treaties 
vesting criminal jurisdiction in Indian tribes were executed before 
the end of the eighteenth century. Clinton at 531 & n. 128. 
exists in the various Indian tribe "termination acts," passed 
largely in the 1950s. Clinton, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. at 548 & n. 220, 
550-51. This source of state jurisdiction is significant here, 
in that "mixed-blood" Ute Indians were terminated from federal 
supervision and placed under state jurisdiction by the Ute 
Partition Act of 1954, 25 U.S.C. SS 677-677aa (1988). 
A major judicially-created exception to exclusive 
federal jurisdiction over Indian country is that crimes in Indian 
country where neither the victim nor the perpetrator is an Indian 
are subject to state jurisdiction. United States v. Wheeler, 435 
U.S. 313, 324, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 1087 (1978), cited in Goforth v. 
State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); Clinton, 18 
Ariz. L. Rev. at 524-25. 
Finally, the jurisdiction exercised by tribal courts 
varies from tribe to tribe. Here, the Ute Indian Tribe, which 
occupies the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, does not take 
jurisdiction of cases where the parties are not formally enrolled 
members of that tribe, where an alternative forum exists to 
resolve the case, and where tribal interests are not affected. 
Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah. 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 n.8 
(D. Utah 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part. 773 F.2d 1087 (10th 
Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 596 
(1986) (citing Ute Tribe Law and Order Code). 
The forgoing jurisdictional rules effectively provide 
that where the perpetrator or the victim of a crime, but not 
both, are Indian, and the crime is committed within Indian 
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country, then jurisdiction rests exclusively with the federal 
court. However, even if a criminal defendant is an Indian, he or 
she will fall under state jurisdiction if a federal termination 
act so provides. Where neither the perpetrator nor the victim is 
an Indian, even where the crime occurs in Indian country, the 
state court has jurisdiction. If both perpetrator and victim are 
Indian, and the crime occurs in Indian country and is "minor," 
then tribal courts may have jurisdiction. 
Here, defendant does not allege that both he and the 
victim of his crime are Indians, nor does he otherwise suggest 
that jurisdiction properly lies in the Ute tribal court. Indeed, 
under Ute tribal law, he has no basis for such an assertion, 
because he does not claim to be formally enrolled in that tribe. 
Instead, defendant's claim is that only the federal district 
court had jurisdiction to try him for the forgery (Br. of 
Appellant at 5, 6). Thus the claimed jurisdictional conflict is 
only between state and federal jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM WAS WAIVED BY THE 
FAILURE TO RAISE IT IN THE TRIAL COURT, AND 
THE CONVICTION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
A. To Fall Outside State Jurisdiction Under 
Present Law, Defendant Must be an Indian. 
As explained in the introduction to this argument, in 
order for defendant to fall outside of state jurisdiction, his 
crime must have been committed in Indian country, and defendant 
must be an Indian. Under the present law of this Court, the 
9 
forgery was committed in Indian country, because Roosevelt lies 
within the outer boundary of an Indian reservation. State v. 
Haaen, 802 P.2d 745, 747 (Utah App. 1990), cert, granted April 
23, 1991, Utah Supreme Court No. 910017. This law may change, 
however, pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's grant of certiorari 
in Hagen and the pending case of State v. Perank, Utah Supreme 
Court No. 860196. Both those cases deal with the question of 
whether the town of Myton, near Roosevelt, is no longer Indian 
country, because of federal "disestablishment" of the Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation.4 
If the supreme court rules in favor of the State in 
Haaen and Perank, it is likely that Roosevelt can also be held 
not to be Indian country. In that case, even if defendant is an 
Indian, his conviction would be proper because the crime was 
committed outside of Indian country, under exclusive state court 
jurisdiction. St. Cloud v. United States. 702 F. Supp. 1456, 
1459 (D.S.D. 1988) ("State courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
over crimes occurring outside of Indian country"). See also Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-1-201(a) (1990) (Utah state courts have 
jurisdiction over offenses committed within the state). As it 
did in Hagen, then, the State suggests that it may be wise for 
this court to await the outcome of Perank, and now also Haaen. in 
the supreme court before deciding this case. 
However, even if the Indian country status of Roosevelt 
4The State's brief in Hagen, including a portion of its brief 
in Perank, is copied at Appendix 2 of this brief. 
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must be accepted for the time being, it cannot be conceded that 
defendant is an Indian. Even now, he has provided no independent 
corroboration of Indian status, but relies solely on the naked 
allegations in his brief and attached affidavit. 
The two elements required to prove Indian status are 
recited in Hagen, 802 P.2d at 747 n.2. First, it must appear 
that defendant has a significant percentage of Indian blood, and 
second, defendant must be recognized as an Indian either by the 
federal government or some group of Indians. JDd. (citations 
omitted); Ex Parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938); Clinton, 
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a 
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503, 515-16 (1976) (copied 
at Appendix 1 of this brief). 
The foregoing elements of Indian status are highly 
fact-dependent. The "Indian blood" element, for example, 
presents a question of fact, quite apart from the legal question 
of how much Indian blood is sufficient to satisfy that element. 
See Hacren, 802 P.2d at 747 n.2 (noting division of authority en 
the latter question). See Brief of Appellant at 36 (alleging 
Indian ancestry). 
The allegations now made by defendant to support the 
"recognition" element of Indian status are also factual issues. 
See Brief of Appellant at 35-36 (alleging history of Indian 
upbringing, receipt of Indian benefits, participation in Indian 
culture, membership in Indian organizations). However, defendant 
raised no jurisdictional challenge and presented no evidence on 
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any factual issues related to Indian status in the trial court. 
B. The Jurisdictional Problem in this Case was 
Neither Raised Nor Otherwise Apparent to the Trial 
Court. 
In his brief on appeal and the affidavit he has 
attached to that brief, defendant asserts that he raised his 
jurisdictional challenge in the trial court, and that his 
challenge was repeatedly rebuffed (Br. of Appellant at 2, 3, 9). 
None of these assertions are documented by record citations, as 
required by Utah R. App. P. 24(e). 
Neither defendant's brief nor the affidavit attached to 
that brief are part of the record on appeal, because neither is 
an original paper or exhibit filed with the trial court. Utah R. 
App. P. 11(a). Therefore, the factual allegations therein, to 
the extent they are offered as evidence, should be ignored. 
State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986) (references to 
matters outside the record are inappropriate, irrelevant, and 
will not be considered on appeal). Further, the State's 
examination of the actual record has revealed no jurisdictional 
challenge.5 
5For example, defendant claims that he raised his 
jurisdictional challenge on or about March 18, 1985 (Br. of 
Appellant at 2). The record shows that a hearing was held on March 
19, 1985, but the minute entry commemorating that hearing does not 
mention any jurisdictional challenge (R. 7). 
Defendant claims to have renewed his jurisdictional challenge 
during an in-chambers conference just before his forgery trial, on 
August 14, 1985 (affidavit attached to Br. of Appellant, at 3(A)). 
However, the record reveals only a motion in limine, which was 
granted (T. 8/14/85 at 3-4), and a later motion to dismiss based on 
insufficient evidence, which was denied (T. 8/14/85 at 27-28). 
Finally, defendant also claims that he raised his 
jurisdictional challenge during proceedings involving a murder 
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Defendant also failed to raise the jurisdictional issue 
at any point in the trial court proceedings associated with his 
petition for postconviction relief in this case (e.g., R. 56-59; 
T. 3/1/90). Thus he raises the Indian jurisdiction issue for the 
first time on appeal. 
Consistent with the absence of any jurisdictional 
challenge, the trial court records are otherwise devoid of any 
evidence that defendant is an Indian. The issue did not even 
arise inadvertently through evidence and testimony routinely 
presented in the case. Additionally, it does not appear that the 
possibility of Indian status should have been obvious to the 
trial court. Defendant's name does not suggest that he is an 
Indian, and the record contains no reference to his race. As 
follows, then, because the Indian jurisdiction issue was not 
raised in the trial court, it should be deemed waived on appeal. 
C. The Indian Status Issue Should be Deemed 
Waived bv Defendant's Failure to Raise it in 
the Trial Court. 
Defendant argues that the state court lacked "Personal, 
Subject Matter, and territorial Jurisdiction" to prosecute him 
for the forgery (Br. of Appellant at 5). To resolve this appeal, 
some consideration must be given to which, if any, of these types 
of jurisdictional problems exists here. 
The "territorial jurisdiction" problem appears to 
charge that was pending against him at the same time as the forgery 
charge (Br. of Appellant at 2). The murder case record is not a 
part of the record in this case. Accordingly, references to the 
murder case should also be ignored, and will not be further 
addressed in the State's brief. 
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address the status of the place where the forgery occurred, 
specifically, whether Roosevelt is Indian country. As noted, 
because that issue is pending before the Utah Supreme Court in 
Hagen and Perank, the State, without conceding it, will not 
further address it in this brief. 
It remains to be determined whether the jurisdictional 
problem should be treated as one of personal jurisdiction or as 
subject matter jurisdiction. As follows, the State's position is 
that while the problem resembles subject matter jurisdiction, it 
should be treated here as having been waived, like personal 
jurisdiction, by the failure to present it in the trial court. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h) (applicable to criminal proceedings via 
Utah R. Civ. P. 81) (personal jurisdiction defect is waived if 
not raised in trial court). 
Utah law is unsettled on the question of whether Indian 
jurisdiction should be treated as personal jurisdiction or 
subject matter jurisdiction. In State Dep't of Social Services 
v. Viiil, 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court 
avoided the question in a civil context, reversing a judgment for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, thereby not reaching 
defendant's claim that personal jurisdiction was also lacking. 
Id. at 1134. In Haaen and State v. Coando. 784 P.2d 1228, 1229 
(Utah App. 1989), cert, granted, Utah Supreme Court No. 900019 
(March 7, 1990), this Court treated the problem in the criminal 
context without reference to whether it involved personal or 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
14 
Because Indian jurisdiction involves the allocation of 
authority among various courts, it would appear to involve 
subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, it has been held that 
Indian criminal jurisdiction, like subject matter jurisdiction, 
cannot be waived by the failure to raise it or by consent of the 
parties. See St. Cloud. 702 F. Supp. at 1458; In re Carmen's 
Petition. 165 F. Supp. 942, 950 (D.C. Cal. 1958), aff'd sub nom. 
Dickson v. Carmen, 270 F.2d 809 (9 Cir. 1959), cert, denied. 361 
U.S. 934, 80 S. Ct. 375, reh#g denied, 361 U.S. 973, 80 S. Ct. 
585 (1960); Wesley v. Schneckloth, 55 Wash. 2d 290, 346 P.2d 658# 
662 (1959) (en banc). See also Clinton, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. at 528 
("the issue is subject matter jurisdictionH). 
However, it is questionable whether Indian criminal 
jurisdiction must be strictly treated as non-waivable, subject 
matter jurisdiction. One authority does not cast general 
criminal jurisdiction in terms of personal versus subject matter 
jurisdiction at all, but rather as the power to create criminal 
laws versus the power to enforce them. 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, 
Substantive Criminal Law S 2.7(a) (1986). Notwithstanding the 
authority to the contrary, it has been held, as follows, that the 
issue of Indian criminal jurisdiction can be waived. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit applies a "raise it or lose it" approach to the federal 
prosecution of non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian country: 
It is far more manageable for the defendant 
to shoulder the burden of producing evidence 
that he is a member of a federally recognized 
tribe than it is for the Government to 
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produce evidence that he is not a member of 
any one of the hundreds of such tribes. We 
accordingly hold that the Government need not 
allege the non-Indian status of the defendant 
in an indictment under [18 U.S.C.A.] section 
1152, nor does it have the burden of going 
forward on that issue. Once the defendant 
properly raises the issue of his Indian 
status, then the ultimate burden of proof 
remains, of course, upon the Government. 
United States v. Hester. 719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1983). 
Hester thus held that it is not necessary for the prosecution to 
allege or prove a defendant's non-Indian status until and unless 
the issue is raised by the defendant. 
For several reasons, the Hester approach is sound in a 
case like this, where neither the prosecution nor the trial court 
were on notice that an Indian jurisdiction problem might exist. 
First, if strictly treated as subject matter and entertained even 
though not timely presented, a parade of other state-convicted 
felons who committed their crimes in Indian country can be 
expected to raise similar uncorroborated claims that they are 
"Indians" and demand that their convictions be reversed. This is 
a particularly nightmarish possibility if the burden is placed on 
the State disprove such belated claims.6 
Second, it is the criminal defendant who will best know 
his or her own racial and social background. It is therefore 
reasonable to expect the defendant to raise the Indian 
jurisdiction issue. Such an expectation would not shift the 
6As explained in Point Three, section C of this brief, the 
State's position is that the burden of proving Indian status should 
rest with defendant where the Indian jurisdiction challenge is not 
raised until after the conviction. 
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ultimate burden of proving jurisdiction at trial, which, under 
Haaen, 802 P.2d at 747, lies with the prosecution.7 It would 
simply provide the prosecution with notice that the burden exists 
in the special Indian jurisdiction context, when it is not 
otherwise apparent. 
Third, under the Federal Enclaves Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1152 
(1988), and the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. S 13 (1988), 
if defendant were tried in the federal court, that forum would 
apply Utah's forgery statute to his offense. See United States 
v. Burland, 441 F.2d 1199, 1200 (9th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 
404 U.S. 842, 97 S. Ct. 137 (Montana forgery statute applied to 
Indian country prosecution in federal court). Defendant does not 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that supports his 
conviction. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that he 
would receive any better treatment or a more favorable outcome in 
the federal court, applying Utah law. In this light, defendant's 
effort to challenge jurisdiction can be seen as nothing more than 
forum shopping. To entertain his challenge now would encourage 
criminal defendants who may be Indians to withhold that claim in 
the state court and then, if convicted, raise it to avoid the 
conviction. Requiring the issue to be raised in the trial court 
will discourage the temptation to thus "plant error,f in the trial 
court, a practice this court has condemned. See State v. 
Belaard, 811 P.2d 211, 215 (Utah App. 1991). 
7Contra, State v. Klindt, 782 P.2d 401, 403-04 (Okla. Crim. 
App, 1989) (defendant seeking to avoid state jurisdiction has 
burden of proving Indian status). 
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Fourth, a "raise it or lose it" approach is also 
consistent with Haaen. In Haaen, the reversible error was the 
State's failure, in the trial court, "to prove he [defendant] is 
not an Indian when confronted with his claim that he is.." 802 
P.2d at 746 (emphasis added). Haaen thus assumes that the claim 
of Indian status will be raised in the trial court. Such claim 
was absent here; nor, as noted earlier, was the possibility of 
that claim otherwise apparent. Compare In re Carmen's Petition, 
165 F. Supp. at 950 (although jurisdictional challenge not 
formally raised, trial testimony that defendant was an Indian put 
court on notice of problem, and challenge was not waived). 
Finally, it should be noted that in other contexts, a 
failure to raise a jurisdictional defect in the trial court 
operates as a waiver of the defect on appeal. E.g., State v. 
Smith, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 42 (Utah App. 1991) and State v. 
Ouintana, No. 900264-CA, slip op. at 1 (Utah App. Oct. 4, 1991) 
(State's failure to raise untimeliness of motion to withdraw 
plea, arguably jurisdictional in character, waived where not 
properly raised in trial court). See also State v. Pierce. 782 
P.2d 194, 196 (Utah App. 1989) (non-expiration of criminal 
statute of limitations is jurisdictional issue to be proven by 
prosecution "whenever that issue is properly raised"). 
In sum, because defendant did not make his present 
allegations of Indian status in the trial court, and because 
neither the State nor the trial court was otherwise on notice 
that defendant might be an Indian, this court should hold that 
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defendant waived the issue. Accordingly, his forgery conviction 
should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
IF DEFENDANT IS AN INDIAN, HE IS SUBJECT TO 
STATE COURT JURISDICTION UNDER THE FEDERAL 
TERMINATION OF SUPERVISION OVER MIXED-BLOOD 
UTE INDIANS. 
Even if defendant's undocumented allegations of Indian 
status are taken as true, his conviction should be affirmed 
because his claimed Indian affiliation is with a group of Indians 
that has long been "terminated" from federal criminal 
jurisdiction. Defendant alleges that he is a member of the 
Uintah Band of Ute Indians, and that he is associated with the 
Affiliated Ute Citizens organization, groups that he identifies 
as "Distinct Legal entit[ies]" (Br* of Appellant at 38-39)• 
Regarding the first allegation, defendant says that he 
is Ma Recognized Member of the Uintah Band By Other Members 
thereof" (Br. of Appellant at 28), and does not say that he is 
formally enrolled in that band. He also cites his mother's 
listing on the final roll of "mixed-blood" Ute Indians, published 
in the April 5, 1956 Federal Register8 (Br. of Appellant at 36), 
as a basis for his Uintah band membership. 
As to the alleged membership in the Affiliated Ute 
Citizens, that entity is an organization of mixed-blood Ute 
Indians formed in 1956. It was formed for the purpose of 
representing the mixed-bloods in the distribution of tribal 
8Copied at Appendix 3 of this brief. 
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assets under the Ute Partition Act of 1954, 25 U.S.C.A. SS 677-
677aa (West 1983). Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 128, 135-36, 92 S. Ct. 1456, 1463 (1972). 
The mixed-blood Utes, including defendant's mother, 
were terminated from federal supervision under the Ute Partition 
Act. Regarding those mixed-blood Utes, the Act provides: 
All statutes of the United States which 
affect Indians because of their status as 
Indians shall no longer be applicable to such 
member over which supervision has been 
terminated, and the laws of the several 
States shall apply to such member in the same 
manner as they apply to other citizens within 
their jurisdiction. 
25 U.S.C. S 677v (1988) (emphasis added). The plain language of 
this provision has been unquestioned as ending federal criminal 
jurisdiction over mixed-blood Ute Indians, and vesting that 
jurisdiction in Utah's state courts. See United States v. 
Felter, 546 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 & n. 28 (D. Utah 1982), aff'd, 
752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985). Accord. St. Cloud v. United 
States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1464-65 (D.S.D. 1988) (Indians whose 
tribes have been "terminated" are subject to state jurisdiction). 
Therefore defendant, in claiming to be a mixed-blood Ute, brings 
himself within a class of citizens who, although they have Indian 
heritage, have been expressly made subject to state criminal 
jurisdiction. 
Defendant complains that state jurisdiction over his 
case should not be found just because of his mother's presence on 
the roll of "terminated" mixed-blood Ute Indians. He argues that 
because he was not yet born when the Ute Partition Act took 
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effect, he cannot be one of the "individuals" who were 
"terminated" for federal criminal jurisdiction purposes, unless 
he is first afforded a hearing (Br. of Appellant at 37-40). This 
position is untenable, and unsupported by the history of the Ute 
Partition Act. 
Defendant's complaint is untenable because, by 
extension, it would suggest that nobody is bound by any law 
passed before his or her birth. The legislative history of the 
Act reveals that it was grounded in an agreement between full-
blood and mixed-blood Ute Indians to part company, as distinctive 
groups, with only the former group remaining under federal 
supervision. H.R. Rep. No. 2493, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954), 
reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3355-3359 (1954) 
(copied at Appendix 4 to this brief). Thus the consent of the 
mixed-blood Utes to this arrangement, in 1954, is binding upon 
their descendants today.9 Defendant, if he is descended from 
"terminated" mixed-blood Ute Indians, is subject to the criminal 
jurisdiction of Utah state courts. 
Defendant also ties his claim of Indian status to his 
father's purported eligibility for tribal enrollment (Br. of 
Appellant at 36). It is unclear which tribe is allegedly open to 
defendant's father. It appears, however, that defendant is again 
referring to the Ute tribe, because he identifies his paternal 
9,1
 Termination acts" such as the Ute Partition Act have been 
roundly criticized in more recent years, and in some instances 
repealed. See Felter, 546 F.Supp. at 1004-06. However, the Ute 
Partition Act, whether or not a "good" law, remains the law. 
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grandfather as an enrolled Uncompahgre (id•), and the Uncompahgre 
comprise one "band" of the Ute Indians. Ute Indian Tribe v. 
State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1093 (D. Utah 1981), aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), 
cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 596 (1986). Thus it 
appears that defendant also claims a Ute tribe affiliation 
through his father. Defendant does not say, however, whether his 
father is or is not a •'terminated'1 Indian. On the paternal side, 
then, defendant's jurisdictional status is indeterminate. 
Given, however, that defendant's more specific claimed 
Indian ancestry is traced to his mother, whose Indian status was 
clearly terminated for jurisdictional purposes, and that his 
claimed Indian affiliations are also to "terminated" mixed-blood 
Utes, these considerations should control here. By affiliating 
himself with people who have been terminated from federal 
criminal jurisdiction, then, defendant has effectively subjected 
himself to state criminal jurisdiction, notwithstanding his 
father's uncertain status. On this basis, the state court had 
jurisdiction to try him for forgery under the Ute Partition Act, 
and the conviction should be affirmed. 
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POINT III 
IF THE CONVICTION CANNOT BE AFFIRMED 
OTHERWISE, THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE SHOULD BE 
REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT, WHERE DEFENDANT 
SHOULD BEAR THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 
A. Because No Evidence Relating to Defendant's 
Claimed Indian Status was Presented in the 
Trial Court, there is Nothing to Review on 
Appeal. 
If this Court applies a strict subject matter 
jurisdiction analysis to the Indian jurisdiction question, such 
that defendant can raise it even at this late date, and if it 
will not affirm defendant's conviction under the Ute Partition 
Act, the conviction still cannot be reversed at this time, as 
defendant urges. This Court cannot reach the merits of 
defendant's allegation that he is an Indian, because there is no 
evidence in the record on this fact-sensitive issue. 
Because the issue was never investigated by the trial 
court, only defendant's unsupported allegations of Indian blood 
and Indian recognition in his brief are before this Court. 
Therefore, because appellate courts do not sit to try disputed 
issues of fact, it would be premature for this Court to decide 
the jurisdictional issue raised by defendant at this time. 
Instead, the issue properly belongs in the trial court. 
B. Defendant's Indian Status Claim Should be 
Heard bv the Trial Court on a Limited Remand. 
If defendant's jurisdictional question was not waived, 
the State suggests a remand to the trial court for the limited 
purpose of determining whether defendant is an Indian. If the 
trial court determines that defendant is an Indian, such that the 
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trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the conviction 
must then be set aside. State Dep't of Social Services v. Viiil. 
784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) (judgment entered by a court that 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void). 
By airing his jurisdictional challenge in the trial 
court, defendant will be availing himself of the forum that is 
equipped to decide the issues of fact related to that challenge. 
A full evidentiary hearing, unavailable in the appellate court, 
can be held. At such hearing, both defendant and the State can 
present evidence relating to defendant's claimed Indian status, 
and each side will have the opportunity to test the admissibility 
and credibility of the other's evidence. 
With the evidence before it, the trial court will 
decide whether the allegations that support defendant's claimed 
Indian status are true. The trial court will also be afforded 
the initial opportunity to decide which facts are relevant and 
necessary, as a matter of law, to prove or defeat defendant's 
claim of Indian status. If defendant is found to be a mixed-
blood Ute, the legal question of state jurisdiction over 
defendant under the Ute Partition Act can also be considered. 
Once all this is done, a complete record for appellate review of 
defendant's jurisdictional challenge will be available in the 
event that an appeal is again taken. 
C* In the Trial Court. Defendant Should Bear the 
Burden of Proving that He is an Indian. 
On remand, defendant should bear the burden of 
defeating state court jurisdiction by proving that he is an 
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Indian, because his conviction was entered by a state district 
court, a court of general jurisdiction.10 In a post-judgment 
challenge to the decision of such a court, the burden of proof is 
on the challenger to show a lack of subject matter jurisdiction: 
"When a judgment, including a default judgment, has been entered 
by a court of general jurisdiction, the law presumes that 
jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on the party attacking 
jurisdiction to prove its absence." Villi, 784 P.2d at 1133. 
This allocation of the burden may seem inconsistent 
with this court's holding, in State v. Hacren. 802 P.2d 745, 747 
(Utah App. 1990), cert, granted April 23, 1991, Utah Supreme 
Court No. 910017, that the burden is on the State to show that 
defendant is not an Indian. It is not inconsistent, however. 
In light of Utah's statutory scheme for proof of 
criminal jurisdiction, Haaen places the burden of jurisdictional 
proof at trial on the State. Icl. at 747; Utah Code Ann. SS 76-1-
201, 76-1-501(3) (1990). However, this case involves a 
jurisdictional challenge that has not been raised until long 
after trial. Accordingly, Viiil should control on remand, and 
the burden should be on defendant, by proving that he is an 
Indian, to show that the state court lacked jurisdiction. 
Placing the burden of proof upon defendant under these 
10Defendant was tried and convicted in the Eighth Judicial 
District Court. Utah's district courts have "original jurisdiction 
in all matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute 
. . . ." Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 5. "The district court has 
original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not 
excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited by law." Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-3-4(1) (1990). 
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circumstances would also be sound policy. As noted earlier, this 
jurisdictional challenge may encourage other defendants to raise 
the Indian jurisdiction question, even if it was never raised at 
trial. Placing the burden on defendants to prove the absence of 
jurisdiction will expedite the handling of such future belated 
claims. It will also help discourage those claims that are 
frivolous. Finally, it will be the defendants pressing such 
claims, and not the State, who will have ready access to the 
information needed to show that they are Indians, and that 
jurisdiction should be examined. 
In summary, if defendant's jurisdictional challenge is 
to be entertained at this late date, the trial court is the 
proper place in which to do so. If this challenge is thus 
remanded to the trial court, the burden should be on defendant to 
prove that he is an Indian. 
CONCLUSION 
Based either on Point One or Point Two of this brief, 
defendant's conviction should be affirmed. However, if this 
court cannot affirm on either of those bases, neither should it 
reverse the conviction, for no evidence relevant to defendant's 
claimed Indian status exists in the record now on appeal. In 
that event, as set forth in Point Three, this case should be 
remanded to the trial court, where defendant should bear the 
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burden of proving that jurisdiction was lacking. 
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